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Wrong Side of the Tracks: !e Neglected Human Costs 
of Transporting Oil and Gas 
Lloyd Burton and Paul Stretesky
Abstract
!e connection between human rights and climate change is most evident when examining carbon di-
oxide emissions that result from burning fossil fuels (e.g., sea level rise and displaced coastal cultures). 
However, the transport of fossil fuels also has human rights implications for human rights and climate 
change. !is research focuses on the health and safety risks in2icted on those residents who are adjacent 
to the railways that ship fossil fuels along the US-Canada transportation corridors. Applying sociological 
and jurisprudential perspectives, we review the environmental/climate justice literature as it pertains to 
industrial transport corridors, documenting the forms of heightened risk imposed on those living along 
these transportation paths. Next, we develop an illustrative case study of Canada’s worst rail catastrophe. 
In so doing, we provide evidence of a decades-long failure of US and Canadian regulators to prevent such 
disasters. We interpret that disaster through a human rights case law suggesting that States have an a3rma-
tive duty to protect their citizens from foreseeable disasters. Based on this analysis, we propose speci4c rail 
safety regulatory reforms. We argue that if the US and Canadian governments implement these regulations 
as required under human rights law, they can more e5ectively honor their obligations to their citizens who 
are paying a high human cost for the material bene4ts associated with increased energy production.
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THE MOST SOCIALLY and economically disad-
vantaged o;en su5er the gravest environmental im-
pacts of climate change. Whether it be the sea-lev-
el-rise inundation of low-lying islands and coastal 
areas, or crop and herd failures occasioned by wid-
ening climate extremes, the most marginalized (of-
ten indigenous) peoples seem to bear the heaviest 
burden as global warming irreparably degrades the 
environments on which their livelihoods depend.1 
 !e term climate justice refers to application of 
traditional environmental justice concerns to the 
phenomenon of climate change.2 Frequently cit-
ed examples of climate injustice o;en focus on the 
a;er-e5ects of burning fossil fuels to power global 
economies and civilizations. By contrast, this arti-
cle examines the disproportionate risks in2icted on 
vulnerable populations when these fuels are trans-
ported from their extraction sites. !e growing 
transportation of fossil fuel also means that there 
will be an increase in the number of potentially dev-
astating derailments that will occur when moving 
fuel in unsafe tanker cars. As a result, we propose 
that the US and Canadian governments have hu-
man rights obligations to protect these vulnerable 
populations.
A growing danger
!e energy appetites of the world’s wealthiest na-
tions accelerated a;er World War II, even as these 
same nations were becoming more concerned with 
the environmental impacts of extracting resources 
from their own lands and waters. !e result was a 
rapid growth in the importation of petroleum from 
developing nations located in regions such as the 
Middle East, Central and South America, and Af-
rica.3 
 As oil and gas production expands so too do en-
vironmental and cultural degradation, along with 
severe threats to the health of adjacent (o;en indig-
enous) human populations. Poor countries desper-
ate for economic development have accepted this 
despoliation (or least their leadership elites did) as 
the “price of progress.”4 In some countries, oil and 
gas extraction have actually increased poverty and 
its e5ects, making armed con2ict and human rights 
violations more likely.5 !us, nations rich in oil and 
gas resources may become saddled with the ‘nega-
tive externalities” created by the energy demands of 
the developed world.6
 !e growing energy appetites of developing na-
tions such as China and India have driven energy 
demands higher. Moreover, political instability and 
anti-Western sentiment in energy-rich developing 
regions of the world has cast doubt on the reliability 
of future cheap foreign imports. As a result, there 
has been an increased emphasis on the domestic 
production of oil and gas in the United States and 
Canada—though the US has always been more 
dependent on oil imports from Canada and Latin 
America than from the Middle East.
 Urged on by technological innovations such as 
hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling, oil and 
natural gas are now being extracted from deep shale 
formations that were previously inaccessible. Other 
“non-conventional” fossil fuels such as Canadian 
oil sands are also beginning to claim a greater share 
of the fossil fuel production portfolio. As a result, 
the renewed production of oil and gas in the United 
States and Canada represents an economic boom 
that is estimated to contribute hundreds of billions 
of dollars to the economies of both nations.7As a 
result, the West is now paying more of the envi-
ronmental health costs of fossil fuel production 
that used to be imposed mostly on the developing 
world. While the bene4ts to the global oil and gas 
industries are huge, and the plentitude of relatively 
cheap carbon-based fuels support North American 
economies, those living in the immediate vicinity of 
rail and pipeline corridors are experiencing steadily 
heightening risk for the sake of others’ prosperity, 
as are communities neighboring 4elds from which 
these resources are being extracted.8 
Introduction
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 We begin by examining the plight of these peo-
ple whose health and safety are being compromised. 
We suggest that this is a human rights-based issue 
because the health and safety of residents living 
near transportation corridors are being put at risk 
for the sake of a robust global fossil fuel industry 
and relatively low domestic energy prices. Second, 
we look at the failures of regulatory infrastructure 
in both the United States and Canada. To illustrate 
the potential for signi4cant harm associated with 
increasing production, we demonstrate how inade-
quate US and Canadian regulatory oversight set the 
stage for the calamitous and deadly tank car train 
derailment in Lac Mégantic, Quebec in the summer 
of 2013.
 !ird, we compare the US and Canadian reg-
ulatory failures—regulatory regimes that take 
no account of human rights in the assignment of 
heightened risk to vulnerable populations—with 
the European Court of Human Rights’ assignment 
of moral culpability to governments that fail to pro-
tect their citizens from foreseeable disasters. We 
agree with other analysts that a “a human rights 
approach to environmental protection … ensures 
that the natural world does not deteriorate to the 
point where internationally guaranteed rights such 
as the rights to life, health, property, a family and 
private life, culture, and safe drinking water are seri-
ously impaired.”9 In making this assertion, we draw 
upon international human rights law that sets out 
health standards for every human being. For exam-
ple, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR) states, “everyone has the right 
to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being.” Article 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
declares that there is a “right of everyone to the en-
joyment of the highest attainable standard of phys-
ical and mental health.” While the US has signed 
but not yet rati4ed the ICESCR, it is clear that in-
ternational human rights law emphasizes that States 
must respect the right to health. 
 We conclude by pointing out that human rights 
are increasingly emphasized and applied in, for ex-
ample, the European Union as a deciding principle 
in environmental health disputes. It is our hope 
that health principles emphasized in the European 
Union and in international human rights law are 
also adopted in the US and Canada in the case of 
health risks associated with the transportation of 
oil and gas. As we suggest, the US and Canada ap-
pear to be much more interested in protecting the 
pro4tability of the freight rail industry than ensur-
ing human rights as well as the health and safety 
of those living along its corridors. We illustrate the 
unjust, 2awed logic they use to defend their con-
tinued indi5erence to the human cost of fossil fuels 
transport, and we recommend ways in which this 
particular form of environmental injustice can be 
e5ectively remedied.
In harm’s way
!e transportation of non-conventional fossil fuels 
such as oil sands and shale oil can be a risky busi-
ness, just as natural gas distribution always has been. 
As the production of crude continues to increase, so 
too has crude-by-rail transport. In the last 4ve years 
alone, industry data show a 25-fold increase in the 
volume of US crude-by-rail, from 9,500 carloads in 
2008 to 234,000 in 2012.10 !ere are several reasons 
for this sudden and huge expansion in crude-by-rail 
transport. One is that recently developed shale oil 
4elds, such as the Bakken formation lying beneath 
the US states of North Dakota and Montana and the 
Canadian province of Saskatchewan, are not direct-
ly served by major pipeline systems. And a second 
reason is related to the 4rst: some of the crude from 
newly developed, hydro-fractured formations such 
the Bakken is so volatile and corrosive that pipeline 
companies refuse to ship it. Just a month before a 
rail-shipped load of Bakken crude exploded and 
destroyed downtown Lac Mégantic, the US Feder-
al Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) ruled 
in favor of pipeline companies’ refusal to ship the 
product because of its ultra-hazardous properties.11 
 !e climate justice movement focuses on the 
plight of traditionally disadvantaged groups as its 
principal cause for concern. In the environmen-
tal justice literature, the focus is also on social and 
economic disadvantage. Plenty of evidence exists 
to support this concern, including the 20-year legal 
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struggle of the indigenous and severely impover-
ished peoples of Ecuador’s rural Oriente region to 
get American oil companies to take responsibil-
ity for having devastated their rainforest environ-
ment.12 
 However, a human rights-based perspective 
based on ICESCR and UDHR emphasizes that 
all people should have access to adequate health. 
Robert Bullard recently noted that “environmen-
tal justice is also now framed as a human rights 
issue” because it also promotes the right to health 
for everyone.”13 We expand upon this environmen-
tal justice concern and argue a human rights-based 
approach suggests that any group of people exposed 
to heightened environmental risks is su5ering en-
vironmental injustice.14 Environmental injustice re-
sulting from the rail transportation of oil and gas is 
therefore not always a result of ethnic or socioeco-
nomic disposition. 15 Instead, risk follows transpor-
tation corridors that may transverse low-income 
communities in urban areas and aAuent communi-
ties in non-urban areas.16
 In highly industrialized urban centers in the US, 
low-income communities of color are indeed most 
at risk.17 In those instances, social structural forces 
tend to bring together social disadvantage and envi-
ronmental harm. !e situation is di5erent in rural 
areas where socioeconomic status may not be relat-
ed to risk. Historically, railroads brought econom-
ic prosperity to communities developed along rail 
lines. A town with a railway station was a magnet 
for social and economic activity.18 !us, rural and 
suburban residents living near rail lines are now in 
higher-risk environments because the transport in-
frastructure has become considerably more danger-
ous. Such was the case in the lakeside resort town 
of Lac Mégantic, Quebec, in the summer of 2013, 
when a highly volatile crude-by-rail tank car train 
derailed, exploded into a 4restorm, killed 47 people, 
and completely destroyed the center of the town. 
Lac Mégantic is a quiet, semi-rural lakeside resort 
town, not an industrial hub more accustomed to 
(and prepared for) such disasters.
 !ough not necessarily delineated by either ma-
terial disadvantage or minority group status, un-
suspecting residents in Lac Mégantic lost their lives 
and homes because of failing and overworked in-
frastructure, unsafe operating procedures, and reg-
ulatory indi5erence. All over North America, such 
transport systems are being operated at the very 
limits of their design capacity and life expectancy, 
and for the most part regulators have been willing 
to let this happen—that is, right up to the point 
where a catastrophe exposes their failure to protect 
the public. 
Public trust and regulatory infrastructure
Law’s moral purpose and the administrative state
!e UN speci4cally recognizes climate change as an 
issue for human rights. However, the transportation 
of oil and gas has not yet been included in climate 
change discussions about human rights.19 Never-
theless, under the guise of climate change there is 
a call for governments, corporations, and civil so-
ciety organizations to push for the rati4cation of a 
treaty that would call for sustainable development 
that promotes human rights. For instance, at the 
2012 Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio 
20+ Conference) hosted by the UN, the O3ce of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights Key Mes-
sages document states:
Member states must commit to ensure full coher-
ence between e5orts to advance the green econ-
omy, on the one hand, and their solemn human 
rights obligations on the other. !ey must rec-
ognize that all policies and measures adopted to 
advance sustainable development must be 4rmly 
grounded in, and respectful of, all internationally 
agreed human rights.20
 
As previously noted, the US and Canada support a 
number of treaties that address the issue of health 
under human rights law. Unfortunately, the US has 
failed to ratify the ICECR. Nevertheless, both the 
US and Canada are bound by UDHR. By ratifying 
these treaties, both the US and Canada have agreed 
to adopt mechanisms of protection. As noted below, 
these mechanisms have largely failed, and the regu-
lation of oil and gas transportation does not appear 
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to be living up to the ideals of UDHR. 
 While Rio 20+ articulated lo;y ideals, it stands 
in sharp contrast with the historical economic forc-
es that were crucial to bringing these nation-states 
into being. !e breakneck pace of industrialization 
in the US and Canada helped many industrialists 
amass great fortunes that were then reinvested in 
technological innovations that helped further pro-
duction. But these industrialists also invested their 
wealth in corrupting governmental institutions to 
the extent that they became incapable of using the 
power of the state to protect citizens from the worst 
excesses of the industrial age.21
 It took the Grange Movement in the upper mid-
western US and the urban progressive movement in 
the US and Canada to implement needed govern-
ment reforms in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, and to institute meaningful economic and 
public safety regulatory controls over industries 
run rampant. Since then, interstate (and later, in-
ternational) railroad regulation has been contested 
ground. Generally speaking—and especially since 
deregulation in the 1980s, relatively lax federal reg-
ulation has partially or wholly pre-empted state and 
local government e5orts to compel the railroads to 
operate more safely, and to provide local govern-
ments with better information on the hauling of 
dangerous cargo.22
Disaster mitigation science and the failure of regula-
tory infrastructure 
Both Canada and the US host two federal agencies 
with oversight responsibilities for rail safety: one 
advisory, and the other regulatory. On the advisory 
side, the US agency is the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB); in Canada it is the Trans-
portation Safety Board (TSB). !e lead regulatory 
agency in terms of hazardous materials (hazmat) 
freight rail transport in the US is the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHM-
SA) within the Department of Transportation; in 
Canada, it is Transport Canada (TC).
 As in Canada, the US Congress created the 
NTSB as an investigatory agency to study the cir-
cumstances contributing to accidents in commer-
cial conveyance such as airlines, pipelines, and rail. 
!e NTSB is also responsible for comparing these 
circumstances with previous similar events and rec-
ommending systemic changes. Congress and Par-
liament created these independent, evidence-based, 
nonpartisan advisory boards because the regulatory 
agencies to which the boards direct their recom-
mendations (in the case of rail, PHMSA and TC) 
are subject to political pressure by the regulated in-
dustries, sometimes resulting in seriously compro-
mised safety regulations. 
 When overly compromised, the result is agency 
capture: that is, the regulatory agency becomes cap-
tive to the political in2uence of the industries they 
were set up to regulate in the public interest.23 When 
agency capture becomes severe enough, regulatory 
failure ensues. In deference to industry, the agency 
fails in its statutory responsibility to protect public 
health and safety. To illustrate this point, we analyze 
the actions of the US National Transportation Safe-
ty Board and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration over the last two decades on 
the subject of transporting hazardous liquid fuels 
by rail. !is examination reveals regulatory failure 
on the part of PHMSA, which—along with similar 
failures by Transport Canada, as documented by the 
Canadian Auditor General—set the stage for the 
tragedy at Lac Mégantic.
Recipe for Canada’s worst rail disaster
In May 1991, the NTSB sent a report to the US De-
partment of Transportation documenting its exten-
sive research into dozens of tank car train derail-
ments spilling toxic and hazardous substances into 
the environment.24 !e common denominator in 
all these cases was a particular model of railroad 
tank car—the DOT 111. !is is a general-purpose, 
non-pressurized vehicle the railroads use to haul 
everything from cooking oil to 2ammable and ex-
plosive fuels. It makes up about 70% of the Ameri-
can tank car 2eet, and nearly 80% of the Canadian 
2eet. 
 !e NTSB research showed that when these cars 
derailed, they nearly always punctured and spilled 
their cargoes, owing to thin skins and fragile head 
shields, exposed valve 4xtures likely to snap o5 in 
a wreck, and coupling devices that punctured oth-
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er cars’ head shields in a pile-up. Some critics have 
dubbed the DOT 111s the “Ford Pinto of the freight 
rail industry.”25 !e NTSB recommended that DOT 
stop using these cars to haul hazardous liquids until 
they had been re4tted and reinforced.26 However, 
DOT declined to do so.
 In 2009, nearly two decades a;er the NTSB rec-
ommendation, unmodi4ed DOT 111s were still haul-
ing 2ammable carbon-based liquid fuels; six more 
major derailment disasters involving breached, 
exploding, and burning DOT 111s had occurred; 
the NTSB has repeatedly warned of the dangers 
these cars pose when hauling hazardous liquids; 
and PHMSA had repeatedly refused to follow the 
NTSB’s advice that these cars either be retro4tted or 
taken out of hazardous materials transport service. 
 In June 2009, a freight train owned by the Ca-
nadian National Railway Company (CN) and haul-
ing DOT 111s 4lled with ethanol, derailed at a road 
crossing in Cherry Valley, Illinois. !e cars punc-
tured each other, leaked, and caught 4re, killing 
one of many motorists stopped at the crossing and 
severely injuring several more.27 In 2012, the NTSB 
issued its report on the Cherry Valley disaster, cat-
aloguing the factors contributing to this tragedy. 
Topping the list was the failure of the DOT 111s car-
rying this 2ammable fuel to contain their cargo on 
derailment—the same message the NTSB had been 
sending to federal railway safety regulators since 
1991. 
 But the report also cited other factors, such as (1) 
the train operators were not informed that the track 
ahead of them had been washed out by a 2ood, even 
though CN headquarters had this vital information; 
(2) emergency responders did not have timely and 
accurate information about the tank cars’ contents 
(since PHMSA only requires train operators to have 
a hard copy of train contents in the cab of the lead 
locomotive, which in this case had driven into a 
washout); and (3) CN failed to work with county 
o3cials to abate 2ooding on its tracks.28
 Alarmed at PHMSA’s continued refusal to heed 
NTSB’s warnings, communities and citizens’ groups 
along rail transport corridors in northern Illinois 
petitioned PHMSA to undertake a rule-making for 
the purpose of adopting the NTSB’s recommenda-
tion. !e agency took the petitions under advise-
ment, along with others 4led in opposition by in-
dustry. Another year went by. In July 2013, the sole 
engineer on a freight train owned by Montreal, 
Maine, and Atlantic Railroad parked for the night 
on a rise above the small resort town of Lac Mégan-
tic, Quebec and le; the train unattended. It includ-
ed dozens of DOT 111 tank cars, labeled as carrying 
crude oil, which is normally neither explosive nor 
easily 2ammable. Later that night, the brakes gave 
way, and the driverless train rolled down into Lac 
Mégantic and derailed in the middle of town. !e 
tank cars le; the tracks, punctured each other, and 
exploded. Forty-seven people died, scores more 
were injured, and the 4res took days to extinguish.29 
!e railroad owners 4rst blamed their own engi-
neer, then local 4remen who had put out a small 
4re on the train the day before, and then vandalism. 
Investigative reporting later uncovered the truth: 
everything that had gone wrong could be traced to 
failed government oversight.
 On the Canadian side, TC allowed large freight 
trains carrying hazardous cargo to be operated by a 
single engineer, and to be le; unattended overnight. 
!ey also did not require shippers to test and verify 
the volatility of hazardous liquids in unpressurized 
tank cars. !e inherently unsafe tank cars on this 
train were carrying crude oil from North Dakota’s 
Bakken formation, which was so 2ammable, explo-
sive, and toxic that the pipeline companies had re-
fused to ship it.
 On the American side, PHMSA had still not 
taken action to disallow the transport of such dan-
gerous cargo in unmodi4ed DOT 111s. Had it done 
so, TC would have been compelled to follow suit, 
because of the intense and continuous interpenetra-
tion of the international boundary by US and Ca-
nadian company-owned freight-trains carrying US 
and Canadian-produced carbon-based fuels.
 Two months a;er the Lac Mégantic tragedy, 
PHMSA announced a rule-making procedure in 
response to rail corridor community and industry 
petitions.30 But in the text of its Announcement of 
Propose Rule Making, PHMSA all but declared its 
continuing deference to industry at the expense of 
public safety. Although NTSB research reports had 
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conclusively proven the great dangers of hauling 
2ammable liquids in unmodi4ed DOT 111s, PHM-
SA’s announcement says that while there “may be 
safety bene4ts” attained by adopting the NTSB’s 
recommendations, there will also be “regulatory 
burdens.”31 As it raised the possibility of further reg-
ulation, PHMSA cast aspersions on NTSB’s solid 
science, while at the same time fretting about indus-
try compliance costs. In the end, the Lac Mégantic 
disaster represents a failure of Canada and the US 
to create and enforce important regulatory mecha-
nisms that protect the health of citizens under hu-
man rights law.
Repairing regulatory failure
!e Canadian government response to the regula-
tory failure precipitating the Lac Mégantic tragedy 
was in some ways swi;er, more incisive, and far 
more self-critical than the American one. !e Ca-
nadian Auditor General launched an immediate in-
vestigation, and in November 2013 issued a damning 
analysis of TC’s failure to protect public and safety.32 
According to the report, TC was so underfunded, 
so understa5ed, and so peopled by employees un-
quali4ed to do their work that its 4g-leaf defense of 
allowing industry to “self-regulate” was tantamount 
to surrendering the regulatory 4eld. !e need for 
action is now unavoidable.
 !e same is true of PHMSA. As of this writing, 
the comment period on its latest hazmat rail trans-
port rulemaking has ended, and the agency is at a 
crossroads. As before, it may again retreat into inac-
tion, fearful of imposing compliance costs on indus-
try, forcing the railroads to keep hauling 2ammable 
liquids in unreinforced DOT 111s. !e agency may 
also order unreinforced DOT 111s out of service for 
hazmat transport, as the rail industry is now urg-
ing. !is step could re-instill in the American public 
some degree of faith in PHMSA’s ability to protect 
them.
 Until November 2013, the smart money in terms 
of regulatory handicapping was on PHMSA letting 
the unreinforced 111s stay in hazmat service, for fear 
of otherwise restricting the 2ow of dangerous Bak-
ken crude to Canadian and US Atlantic coast re4n-
eries.
 In the freight rail industry, the railroads do not 
own most of the rolling stock they transport. Nei-
ther the oil and gas companies nor the railroads 
have any particular interest in sinking their wealth 
into a 40-year infrastructure investment (the aver-
age life of a rail tank car), while the ongoing struggle 
between rail and pipeline transport of oil and gas in 
North American continues to play itself out. Most 
of the tank car 2eet is owned by holding companies 
set up for just that purpose.33
 !ese holding companies are simply looking for 
rents on the space in their cars. And the contents of 
those cars—the tenants—are provided by the ship-
pers. Producers contract with the shippers to 4nd 
tank car space to haul their product from 4eld to 
re4nery. !e shippers will load cargo (including the 
highly volatile Bakken crude) into any tank car al-
lowed by federal regulators. US federal regulators 
continue to allow Bakken crude to be shipped in 
unreinforced DOT 111s.
 !ese industry stakeholders continued to resist 
additional regulatory restrictions until a Bakken 
crude-laden train of DOT 111s derailed, exploded, 
and burst into 2ames in rural Alabama in Novem-
ber 2013; followed by yet another derailment di-
saster involving the same type of car and the same 
Bakken crude in North Dakota in December 2013. 
Finally, it then became clear to the public that haul-
ing Bakken crude in DOT 111s was a literal recipe 
for disaster. !e regional railroad responsible for 
the Lac Mégantic calamity had 4led for bankrupt-
cy within weeks of the incident: compliance with 
inadequate federal regulations would have been no 
defense against the negligence claims of survivors 
in wrongful death actions against the railroad in the 
Canadian courts.
 PHMSA’s excuse for not decommissioning unre-
inforced DOT 111s has been denied it, and by the very 
industry whose pro4ts PHMSA had been trying to 
protect. As of the end of 2013, the only reason PHM-
SA had le; for not taking these cars out of service 
was that it would slow the transport of high-hazard 
crude from production 4elds to coastal re4neries, to 
feed global and domestic energy markets. PHMSA 
may also fear that the O3ce of Management and 
Budget would strike down tougher new regulations 
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anyway, using its application of cost-bene4t analysis 
to value the death and dismemberment of rail corri-
dor residents at a far lower level than industry costs 
to make their trains safer.
 !is leaves PHMSA at an historic crossroads. 
It can either continue to allow dangerously inade-
quate tank cars to ship dangerous cargo, or it can 
take a stand for the rights of the vulnerable popu-
lations living along these rail transport corridors, 
and restrict such shipments until they can be car-
ried in tank cars equal to the dangers of the cargo 
they are hauling. !e predicament that PHMSA and 
TC both 4nd themselves in at this point is that they 
are 4ghting rear-guard actions. !ey have focused 
on individual, isolated contributors to catastroph-
ic derailment disasters (volatile cargo, 2imsy tank 
cars, operator misfeasance, and antiquated infor-
mation systems), rather than the risk factors that 
create disaster-prone scenarios far greater in con-
sequence than any single factor might suggest. !ey 
both have a history of ignoring the advice of their 
respective transportation safety boards, repeatedly 
declining to assertively regulate the rail transport 
industries to protect the health and safety of those 
adjacent to transport corridors.
Regulating as if human rights mattered
In US environmental laws, the question of cost in 
reducing environmental risk is handled in di5erent 
ways. Some statutes allow risk reduction costs to be 
factored directly into decisions about whether or 
not to regulate. !is is something the White House’s 
O3ce of Management and Budget does anyway.34 
Others, such as the toxics provisions of the Clean 
Air and Clean Water Act, order the Environmental 
Protection Agency to protect public health with an 
“adequate margin of safety,” irrespective of cost. !e 
EPA is encouraged to determine the most cost-ef-
fective means of achieving this objective, but the 
issue of whether or not to regulate is not in ques-
tion; public health and safety come 4rst. !is is in 
contrast with PMHSA and TC, which have refused 
to institute a regulatory ban on using unreinforced 
DOT 111 tank cars to haul 2ammable liquids be-
cause of what it would cost industry to make the 
cars safer.
 PHMSA and TC’s regulatory stance is reactive 
and single-cause oriented. For instance, PHMSA’s 
September 2013 rulemaking announcement singles 
out tank car safety as a principal risk factor, along 
with inaccessible information about train contents. 
Yet calamitous rail disasters such as Lac Mégantic 
are triggered by a range of interacting risk factors.
Sometimes, a large public accident revealing regu-
latory failure can lead to public pressure on Con-
gress for new regulation.35 All too o;en, however, 
these regulatory actions address only the speci4c 
causes of a particular catastrophe, without address-
ing systemic change. !ere is cause for concern 
that Canadian and US regulatory responses to the 
Lac Mégantic disaster will be the same: a post-hoc, 
piecemeal response to this tragedy that does little to 
preclude future such disasters.
Framing and blaming: Human rights and govern-
ment responsibilities in Europe and North America 
Five years a;er the end of World War II, and two 
years a;er the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was adopted, 47 European nation-states 
signed the European Convention of Human Rights 
to assure citizens of signatory countries that the 
treaty would protect their rights even if their home 
countries infringed on them. !e European Court 
of Human Rights hears cases arising under the Con-
vention.
 In 2004, and again in 2008, the ECHR decided 
cases brought by aggrieved citizens against Turkey 
and Russia, respectively, for failure to protect them 
from catastrophic disasters caused by public infra-
structure failures. In both cases, the Court found 
that government had an a3rmative duty to prevent 
the reasonably foreseeable and thus preventable di-
sasters that had befallen the plainti5s. 36
 !ese moral obligations of governments hearken 
back to Aristotle and Justinian. !ey also comport 
with the precautionary principle governing envi-
ronmental risk decision-making in EU law. Paral-
leling Kant’s categorical imperative, the principle 
calls for industry or government o3cials to show 
that signi4cant changes to the built environment 
will not cause additional risk to public health and 
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safety, rather than citizens needing to prove that 
such changes will subject them to greater harm.
 In working with European colleagues, both au-
thors of this article have learned that—just as with 
any other archetypical framework for governmental 
decision making—its day to day application may 
not always be in accord with the ideal form of the 
structure. For instance, concept of proportionality 
may play a signi4cant role in its implementation; 
that is, the burden of proof a proponent industry 
or government agency must carry in preventive risk 
analysis is proportional to both the probability and 
consequences of various forms of environmental 
harm.37 
 !ere is nothing in either US or Canadian federal 
law alluding to a human right to a safe, clean envi-
ronment. What one 4nds instead is a stark exercise 
in utilitarianism. In the United States, no federal 
regulation intended to better protect public health 
and safety will be put into e5ect unless the agency 
proposing it can prove to the O3ce of Management 
and Budget that its bene4ts will exceed its costs. And 
in the case of rail safety regulation, a;er the OMB 
a3xes a dollar value to a human life, multiplies that 
by the probability of death and dismemberment oc-
casioned by a derailment, and then compares that to 
industry compliance costs in building a new 2eet of 
tank cars, rail corridor neighbors are likely to lose. 
Public health and safety is not the 4rst concern in 
this formula; it is the last.38
 !e political economy of energy demands at the 
global level drive health outcomes in particular lo-
cales, such as Lac Mégantic.39 !at is, the movement 
of energy occurs in a globalized environment where 
advances in extractive technologies are in constant 
tension with local human rights duties to protect 
and respect the right to health. !us, the demand 
for cheap energy can result in threats not only to the 
most vulnerable populations, but also to all those 
in the vicinity of crumbling railway infrastructures 
that are badly mismanaged by governments and not 
su3ciently regulated. As a result, the types of disas-
ters that occur in the movement of oil may result 
in disasters that constitute human rights violations. 
!e utilitarian calculus used by US and Canadian 
regulators will always and inevitably rank the dol-
lar value of human lives lost in low-probability, 
high-consequence events like derailments lower 
than the industry costs of building safer infrastruc-
ture. 
 !is regulatory approach is morally and legally 
2awed. It also violates principles of human rights 
laid out in the ICESCR and UDHR, and both coun-
tries should be held accountable. !us, national 
legislators and regulators share moral culpability 
for failing to accord greater importance to the hu-
man rights of rail corridor residents than they do 
the pro4tability of the rail and fossil fuels indus-
tries. Congress and the Parliament are culpable for 
not unambiguously instructing their regulators to 
honor their citizens’ human rights to a safe environ-
ment. Regulators are equally at fault for not using 
their limited to protect the rail corridor residents 
who —wrongly, as it turned out—trusted their gov-
ernment to protect them.
Righting the scales of environmental           
injustice
 Lac Mégantic was a tragic and spectacular disaster, 
unique for the scope of its destruction and for the 
light cast on the regulatory failures that set the stage 
for this catastrophe. Other than that, it was simply 
the highest pro4le example of a very long list of 
similar disasters, and stretching into our future as 
well.40With the rapidly expanding volumes of car-
bon-based fuels now being transported by rail and 
pipeline to feed both domestic and global markets, 
it is not a question of whether there will be future 
such disasters, but of when, where, and how big 
they will be.
 !e dominant news media narrative (as well as 
that of government and industry) applied to cata-
strophic events such as Lac Mégantic is that they 
are abnormal, freakish, rare, and unforeseeable. !e 
blame is almost always assigned 4rst to causes like 
a feckless employee, failed equipment, or nefarious 
doings.41 As previously noted, this was the case in 
the Lac Mégantic derailment because the president 
of the railroad initially blamed his engineer for the 
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disaster. Only later was it revealed that—with reg-
ulatory approval—the engineer was operating sole 
engineer freight trains and leaving them unattend-
ed to cut labor costs. A month a;er the crash, the 
railroad 4led for bankruptcy.
 !e alternative view, and the one we subscribe 
to, is that derailment disasters are an inevitable 
side e5ect of operating such complex, massive, in-
tricately interconnected, and inherently dangerous 
transport systems. !e task, therefore, is to model 
accident risks using systemic analysis that mirrors 
the complexity of the transport system, and then 
use the outputs to preventively regulate all potential 
contributory causes to future disasters. It is only by 
these means that government can meet its human 
rights obligations and the high duty of protective 
care for these vulnerable populations.42
 Principles of environmental justice require it, 
and in all likelihood only Congress and the Parlia-
ment can do it, only this time they need to provide 
the agencies with enough statutory authority and 
the funding to do a proper job of it. Somehow, a 
Kantian concern for the well-being of those most 
threatened by the explosive growth in North Amer-
ican oil and gas extraction and transport needs to 
4nd its way into new rail safety legislation. At least 
in American law and government, it will take a fair-
ly explicit message from Congress for the DOT and 
OMB to get the message that they need to reorder 
their priorities. So far, the regulatory agencies en-
trusted with protecting these communities at risk 
have proven themselves unworthy of public trust.
 Transport Canada may have su3cient regulato-
ry discretion to factor human rights into rail safety 
regulatory reform of its own accord, or it may need 
a nudge from Parliament. But based on past perfor-
mance, Americans have no reason to believe their 
freight rail regulators will do a better job of protect-
ing their right to health and safety from rail disas-
ters in the future than they have in the past. !eir 
only hope seems to be for either the president or the 
Congress to declare that rail corridor residents have 
as much a right to a safe and healthy environment as 
the rest of their fellow citizens—and that this right 
should be no less assured in the US than in the rest 
of the ‘civilized’ world.
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